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Abstract: Excess nutrients in surface water systems cause many environmental problems. Some 
governments restrict nutrient overloading through nutrient permits. Economic theory states that the best 
allocation of such permits is made via trading. However, nutrient permit trading is complicated by two 
factors associated especially with non-point sources: (1) time lags between loading and appearance in a water 
body and (2) differences between the load and the quantity transported to a water body. In a nutrient permit 
market, the prices and allocations depend heavily on these hydro-geological factors, so they should be 
incorporated into the trading system. Nutrient trading programs to date fail to include all factors 
simultaneously.   
We present a new system for trading point and non-point source nitrate permits. The methodology of trading 
is based on a simulation-optimization approach which is similar to the simulation-optimization approaches 
used in other non-market based nutrient management programs. Simulations are used to incorporate the 
hydro-geological impacts and a simple optimization technique is used to clear the market. The system 
consists of four components. First, a farm simulation model estimates the nutrient leaching from farm 
practices. Second, a nutrient transport model simulates the fate of leached nutrients in the catchment. Third, 
traders bid to buy and offer to sell in a centralized online auction. Finally, a linear program finds optimal 
trades based on the bids and water quality standards. 
Using a simple example, we show how this system facilitates trade among point and non-point sources. The 
illustration is for nitrates, but the concept applies to other contaminants such as phosphates. The example 
addresses the common case in which nitrates enter a river from both groundwater and direct point sources. 
The permits specify the maximum allowed nitrate loading into the aquifer for non-point sources and into the 
river directly for point sources. The results suggest that trade among point and non-point sources is desirable 
only under some hydrological and economic conditions. If nitrate transport in groundwater is sufficiently fast 
that a significant amount of nitrates leached from non-point sources reach the receiving surface water body 
within a year or few, the opportunities for trade between point and non-point sources are high.  
We investigated trading under two market rules. First, the market allows trade in permits valid for a single 
year only (year-1 permits, permits for next year) and second, the market allows trade in different permits 
valid for distinct future years (year-1, year-2, …, year-5 permits, permits for next five years). We found that 
the latter provides more opportunities for trade between point and non-point sources, because the non-point 
source bids for recent permits have to compete with the point source bids for future permits. Therefore, point 
and non-point source nutrient trading is most suitable when nutrient flow in the catchment is relatively fast 
and/or point sources are willing to buy future permits.    
The price assigned to each source reflects all its spatiotemporal impacts, transaction costs are negligible as 
the sources buy permits from a centralized auction without having to find sellers, and water quality standards 
are always maintained. However, in trading loading-based permits, the problem of resource allocation over 
time arises as nutrients loaded into the aquifer from distinct non-point sources may reach a surface water 
body gradually over many years.  Defining permits based on the water quality constraints is a solution, but 
the sources will have to purchase a portfolio of permits to match their impacts on the constraints defined over 
time and the set of receptors. Linear Programming is applicable if the underlying assumptions hold; mainly, 
the relationship between the quantity of nitrates loaded and the quantity transported to a receptor is linear.   
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Nutrient overload in surface water systems is a global environmental concern (OCED, 2008; Onglay, 1999). 
Excess nutrients cause eutrophication (plant growth) and hypoxia (shortage of oxygen) in rivers and lakes.  
Commonly found nutrients in water are nitrogen in the form of nitrate and phosphorus in the form of 
phosphates. 
Nutrients enter water ways from point sources and non-point sources. Point sources (PS) are direct emissions 
into surface water bodies from factories, sewage treatment plants, and waste water canals. Non point sources 
(NPS) are agricultural and other land uses from which pollutants migrate to water bodies via groundwater 
flux or surface runoff. Compared to point source nutrient pollution, non-point source nutrient pollution is 
difficult to measure and control because it occurs slowly over time and over a wide space. Many rivers and 
lakes under the threat of nutrient pollution usually receive nutrients from both PS and NPS.   
Governments use different policies to control water pollution. The most common are direct controls, 
environmental charges, and tradable pollution permits.   Starvins (2002) discusses many examples for each of 
these pollution control instruments. Tradable permits are licenses issued by an environmental authority 
allowing the holder to produce a specified amount of a specified type of pollution for a specified period. In 
theory, tradable pollution permits achieve the efficient or optimal distribution of pollution permits 
(Montgomery, 1972; McGarlends, 1988).  
Today, governments and environmental authorities have recognized the need for nutrient trading programs 
which allow trade among point and non-point sources (D. Leston, 1992; Ribaudo et al., 1999; Faeth, 2000), 
but the world lacks experience with such nutrient trading systems. The United States is the only exception, 
and has made a significant effort to implement nutrient trading programs even though few trades actually 
take place (King and Kuch, 2003; US EPA, 2007).  
Point and non-point source (PS and NPS ) nutrient trading systems in the United States have many obstacles 
to trade. The first is that only point sources (mainly industrial) are regulated, while non-point sources (mainly 
agricultural) are not. Point sources, if they cannot meet the discharge limits specified by the permits, can pay 
upstream land users to implement best management practices which offset the excess nutrient load. Under the 
above circumstances, US nutrient trading systems are not true point and non-point source trading programs 
mainly because they do not require any purchases by NPS, and trades always occur in one direction.           
In addition, point and non-point source nutrient trading is complicated due to the spatial and temporal 
impacts of NPS. In designing a nutrient trading system, the main difficulties that arise are incorporating the 
effects of:  
• time lags between loading and appearance in a water body (for NPS, the time lag may be many decades 
while for PS, the time lag may be few days), 
• differences between the load and the quantity transported to a water body (the quantity transported does 
not usually enter the receiving water body at once, but gradually over a relatively long period), and  
• many distinct receptors (a receptor is a water body or a point on a water body where water quality is 
monitored). 
In a well designed nutrient trading system, the price assigned to any source (point or non-point) should reflect 
all its effects on all receptors over time and space. Neither the existing trading systems nor the conceptual 
designs of nutrient trading systems proposed to date (US EPA, 2007; Kerr, Rutherford, & Lock, 2007; 
Morgan, Coggins, & Eidman, 2000) take into account all the above hydro-geological impacts simultaneously. 
An interesting development is the use of simulation-optimization approaches as a means of incorporating 
hydro-geological impacts in non-market based nutrient management programs (Morgan and Everett, 2005; 
Amalsri and Kaluarachchi, 2005; and others). Morgan and Everett (2005) describe a simulation-optimization 
approach to determine optimal nitrate loading to an aquifer from decentralized waster water treatment plants. 
They use a groundwater model to simulate nitrate transport and obtain a response matrix which relates the 
source nitrate loading to the concentration at the receptors. The response matrix is then used in a linear 
optimization model which determines the optimal sustainable distribution of nitrate loading. Amalsri and 
Kaluarachchi (2005) present an integrated methodology for optimal management of non-point source nitrate 
loading. They use two simulation models: one which simulates soil nitrogen dynamics and estimates nitrate 
leaching from land uses, and another which simulates the fate and transport of leached nitrates in the aquifer. 
The physical simulations are coupled with an optimization module which utilizes genetic algorithms to 
determine optimal on-ground nitrogen loading subject to water quality standards. Morgan, Coggins, & 
Eidman (2000) present a methodology for trading nutrient permits among NPS. In their trading system, 
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simulations are used to validate trades. Morgan et al. also use two simulations, one to simulate soil nitrogen 
dynamics and another to simulate nitrate transport in groundwater.  
Extending these concepts, we propose a nutrient trading system which employs a simulation-optimization 
approach to facilitate nutrient trading within and among PS and NPS. In this paper, we address a commonly 
found nutrient pollution problem, where nutrients enter a surface water body from NPS via groundwater flux 
and from PS via direct emissions. All sources are regulated and they are required to possess a permit to match 
their nutrient loading on water resources. The system finds optimal prices and allocations while accounting 
for relevant hydrogeology.  
2. A METHODOLOGY FOR TRADING NUTRIENT PERMITS 
We describe a trading system specifically designed for trading nitrate permits in a river catchment. Point 
source permits specify the maximum allowed emission into the river per year in kg/year. Non-point source 
permits specify the maximum allowed loading to the aquifer in kg/ha/year. All permits are valid only for a 
year, but the sources can buy permits for future years.  
The simulation approach proposed is similar to the simulation approaches proposed in Amalsri and 
Kaluarachchi (2005) and Morgan, Coggins, & Eidman (2000) in that we use simulations of soil nitrogen 
dynamics and nitrate transport. The difference is, rather than simulating every possible land use scenario or 
permit exchange, we use the simulation models on a one-off basis as in Morgan and Everett (2005). Below, 
we briefly describe the components of the trading system.  
First, NPS use a leaching loss model to estimate the potential nitrate leaching from possible land uses. The 
model simulates the processes that determine the fate of organic and inorganic nitrogen in the root zone 
(mineralization, immobilization, nitrification, denitrification, and plant uptake) and estimates the nitrate 
leaching per hectare per year.   Based on these estimates, NPS decide the size of the permit required for each 
land use option. Existing computer programs such as SWAT (Neitsch, Arnold, Kiniry, & Williams, 2005) 
and GLEAMS (Knisel, 1993) may be used to estimate the nitrate leaching. We recommend that all NPS 
should use a common authorized leaching loss model.    
PS decide on the size of the permit required in kg/year from the quantity and nitrate concentration of the 
effluents they wish to discharge into the river during the year.  
Second, an environmental authority or a government representative who oversees the trading system 
(hereafter referred to as the auctioneer), uses a catchment nitrate transport model to estimate transport 
coefficients which measure the mass nitrate input to the stream that occurs in each year during the planning 
horizon due to one kg/ha/year nitrate leaching from each non-point source. A separate transport matrix 
should be obtained for every receptor of interest. Commonly available computer codes such as MT3D 
(Zheng, 1990) and MF2K-GWT (U. S. Geological Survey, 2006) may be used to simulate nitrate transport. 
Third, PS and NPS bid to buy permits in an online auction. Everyone buys from the centralized auction rather 
than from a particular seller. This online auction is designed as a smart market, which uses computer 
algorithms to determine the optimal prices and allocations relative to the submitted bids and the relevant 
constraints, using optimization techniques (McCabe, Rassenti, & Smith, 1991). Smart markets have been 
successfully applied in complicated multilateral trading situations such as electricity markets (Hogan, Read, 
& Ring, 1996) and conjectured for water markets (Raffensperger and Milke, 2005). 
Fourth, we employ a linear program to determine the optimal prices and allocations, assuming that a linear 
relationship exists between mass nitrate loading into the aquifer, and mass nitrate input into the river or 
concentration at each receptor. The linear program determines the optimal trades subject to water quality 
standards and submitted bids.  
2.1. A Linear Program to Clear the Market 
Indices: i =1,…, N sources;  j =1,…, M receptors;  t , s = 1,…, T years;  and  k=1,…, K bids.   
Parameters:  
Hijt: concentration that occurs at receptor j, at the end of the year that is t–1 years after a “unit nitrate 
loading” occurred at source i. Unit nitrate loading is defined as 1 kg nitrate emission during a year in the case 
of PS or 1 kg/ha nitrate leaching during a year in the case of NPS.   
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Ĥit: mass nitrate input into the stream that occurs during the year that is t–1 years after a unit nitrate loading 
occurred at source i. The river may be considered as another receptor indexed by a particular j0, but to 
distinguish the main receptor on which point source emissions are directly loaded, we use a separate set of 
transport coefficients for the river.  This is the receptor which affects trade the most. If nitrates do not reside 
in the river for more than a year, for PS, Ĥit 
C
= 1 for t = 1 and 0 for t > 1. 
jt
Ĉ
: the concentration that occurs at receptor j, at the end of year t, from all non-tradable sources. 
t
S
: mass nitrate input into the stream that occurs at receptor j, during year t, from all non-tradable sources. 
jt
Ŝ
: the maximum acceptable concentration at receptor j at the end of year t. 
t
U
: the maximum acceptable mass nitrate input into the stream during year t. 
itk: upper bound on the kth
P
 bid placed by trader i for year-t permits. 
itk: bid price of kth
 
 bid placed by trader i for year-t permits.  
Decision variables: 
xitk: quantity accepted from the kth
q
 bid placed by trader i for year-t permits. 
it
μ
: maximum loading allowed for source i, during year t; this is the size of the year-t permit held by source i 
after trade.  
it
 
 = price of year-t permit assigned to source i. This is the shadow price of constraint 2 below. 
Objective function: Maximize ∑ i ∑ t ∑k (Pitkxitk
Subject to constraints:  
) 
Upper bounds on bids:  xitk ≤ Uitk  for all i, t and k   (1)  θ
Compliance constraints: q
itk 
it − ∑k xitk = 0 for all i and t   (2)  μ
Water quality standards: ∑
it 
i ∑ts=1 Hij(t-s+1)qis  ≤  Sjt− Cjt for all j and t (3)  λ
   ∑
jt 
i ∑ts=1 Ĥ i(t-s+1) qis  ≤  Ŝ t − Ĉ t for all j and t (4)  γ
Other non-negativity constraints:  x
t 
itk  ≥  0  for all i, t and k  (5)  β
The above linear program determines the distribution of nitrate loading among the sources in each year which 
maximises the total utility subject to water quality constraints. It is formulated as a gross pool market in 
which any initial permit holdings are ignored. The bids reflect the preferred resource position at the particular 
price. However, the sources who possess initial holdings can offer to sell. Then the preferred resource 
position is calculated by subtracting the offered quantity from the initially held quantity (for example, if a 
source initially holds a permit of 50 kg and offers to sell 20 kg at $1, then the preferred resource position at 
price $1 is 50-20 = 30 kg). After clearing the market, the net purchases or sales are calculated relative to the 
optimal loading. In this paper, we assume that there are no initial holdings, and everyone has to buy the 
permit he or she needs from the auctioneer, who keeps all revenue from the auction.  
itk 
Sjt− Cjt and Ŝ t − Ĉ t are the net amounts of pollution capacity available for allocation in the auction. We can 
estimate expected values for Cjt and Ĉ t using the same transport simulation model discussed under the 
methodology. However, determining Sjt and Ŝ t should be done carefully. Water quality standards usually 
specify the maximum acceptable pollutant load into a water body during a period or the maximum acceptable 
concentration at a time. If we set Sjt and Ŝt equal to those standards, and some constraint for year t0 becomes 
binding in the solution, we may not be able to allocate any permit that affects period t0 in the future.  We are 
currently studying the optimal method to determine Sjt and Ŝ t, which is a problem of resource allocation over 
time. In this paper we assume that Sjt− Cjt and Ŝ t − Ĉ t
The variables listed in the right hand side of the constraints, θ
 are given, as the total amounts of resources available 
for allocation in the auction. 
itk, μ it, λ jt, γ t, and β itk, are the dual variables 
associated with the constraints. Each of them reflects how much the objective function will improve if the 
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right hand side of the constraint were increased by 1 unit. From the linear programming dual, we can derive 
the price, μ it = ∑ j ∑Ts=t Hij(s-t+1) λ js + ∑Ts=t Ĥ i(t-s+1) γs. The price of source i is determined by its impacts on all 
the receptors over the planning horizon. If only the mass nitrate input into the stream in every year is capped, 
and no other receptors are considered, μ it = ∑Ts=t Ĥ ij(s-t+1) γs
For PS, the price μ
.  
it = Ĥi1  γ t = 1×γ t = γ t. Given μ it = γ t for all PS, unless a considerable portion of nitrates 
loaded from NPS reach the river in the same year of loading, the point source price for a particular year-t0 
permit is independent of the non-point source prices for year-t0 permits and therefore, it is quite likely that 
two independent markets will operate. In the illustration below, we show how a market for a particular year-
t0 permit will operate differently from a market in which year-t1, year-t2, …, year-tT
3. ILLUSTRATION: TRADING NITRATES AMONG PS AND NPS 
 permits are traded 
simultaneously. 
3.1. Hypothetical Case Study 
To demonstrate the trading system, we use a hypothetical river 
catchment of 5 × 5 km2
Using the model, we simulated 1 kg/ha/year nitrate loading from 
each non-point source and obtained the mass nitrate input into the 
river that occurs in each year during a planning horizon of 50 
years. These values are the transport coefficients Ĥ
 area with some PS and NPS. In Figure 1, 
circles indicate PS, and rectangles indicate NPS. We simulated 
nitrate transport in the catchment using MT3D with the flow terms 
obtained from a groundwater flow simulation. The flow model 
was developed with MODFLOW (Harbaugh, Banta, Hill, & 
McDonald, 2000). The hydro-geological parameters used in the 
simulation are listed in Table 1. We have assumed that nitrate 
transport in the aquifer is due to advection, dispersion, and first 
order decay.  
ijt
In this demonstration, we do not estimate the potential 
leaching losses from land uses and we assume that the NPS 
have estimated the size of the permits required using a 
leaching loss model.  
s in the linear 
program (Table 2). A 50-year horizon is sufficient because almost 
all nitrates applied in year 1 at any non-point source in the 
catchment reach the river by 50 years.  
We assume that once nitrates enter the river from PS or NPS, 
they do not reside in the river for more than a year, so there is 
no need to simulate the nitrate transport in the river, and all 
PS are identical in their total impact during a year. 
Only one water quality standard applies: every year, the total 
mass nitrate input into the river should not exceed the pre-
specified standard. Taking into account the water quality 
standard and expected non-tradable source contributions 
including the nitrates already in the aquifer, the auctioneer 
can allocate only 1000 kg of the annual nitrate intake 
capacity of the river. Hence, Ŝ t − Ĉ t    = 1000 kg for all t, for 
this example.  No other receptors are considered.   
 
Figure 1. Hypothetical catchment. 
 
Table 1. Hydro-geological properties used in 
groundwater models. 
Parameter Value 
Hydraulic conductivity (longitudinal) 0.0006 m/s 
Hydraulic conductivity (vertical) 0.0001 m/s 
Storage coefficient 0.0001 1/m 
Effective porosity 0.2 
Longitudinal dispersivity 5 m 
Ratio: H/L dispersivity 0.1 
Ratio: V/L dispersivity 0.01 
Molecular diffusion coefficient 0.00005 
First order decay coefficient 0.0002 1/day 
Recharge (uniform) 100 mm/year 
No. of layers in the models 1 
Cell size in the models 200×200 m2 
 
Table 2. Transport coefficients (Ĥijts) for t = 1, 2, 3, and 50. 
  
 Yr 
Transport coefficients for non-point sources (kg) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 0.000 0.038 0.003 0.000 0.007 0.046 0.111 0.704 1.090 1.698 0.089 0.287 0.026 0.006 0.045 
2 0.002 0.406 0.054 0.003 0.098 0.480 0.553 3.411 4.354 4.921 0.558 1.129 0.179 0.059 0.288 
3 0.021 1.170 0.231 0.022 0.369 1.418 0.919 5.135 5.332 5.290 1.138 1.687 0.401 0.169 0.622 
.                
50 0.623 2.452 1.293 0.405 1.632 3.438 1.192 3.434 2.406 2.441 1.946 1.767 0.904 0.609 1.444 
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We modeled the linear program using the algebraic modeling language AMPL, and included the transport 
coefficients in the AMPL data file. The auction is cleared by running the linear program with submitted bids. 
Next, we demonstrate the results generated by the auction for a set of hypothetical bids.  
3.2. Results and discussion 
Assume the sources bid as given in Table 3 and everyone bids only for year-1 permits. The results are given 
in the first three columns of Table 4. PS can buy all that they bid for, 175 kg/year at a small price of $0.03. 
Only some NPS can buy all they bid.  
Total point source allocation is 875 kg. Accordingly, the 
expected nitrate contribution to the river in year 1 is 875 kg 
from PS and 125 kg from NPS. Some NPS have immediate 
impacts on the river. Even though the non-point source bids 
are identical, NPS 8 and 10 get the least allocations.  The 
reasons are (1) source 10 has the highest impact on the 
year-1 constraint (Ĥ10,1 = 1.698 kg) and have to compete 
with the PS in the market, and (2) source 8 has the highest 
total impact on all constraints ( ∑ t Ĥ8,t
If non-point bid prices were increased by 10 times, source 10 can buy 36 kg while the total point source 
allocation is reduced from 875 kg to 859.5 kg. By paying more, non-point source 10 can buy another 
36−25.396=10.604 kg which would otherwise have been purchased by the point sources. These results 
provide evidence that there is some trading in year-1 permits between point and non-point sources, but not 
much.    
 = 38.57 kg). 
If all sources bid as given in Table 3 for year-1 to year-5 permits simultaneously, the results are shown in 
columns 4 to 13 in Table 4. All NPS can buy less year-1 permits than they would have bought if everyone 
had bid only for year-1 permits. When PS bid to buy future permits, NPS are burdened with their bids for 
recent permits (for example, year-1 permits) competing with the point source bids for future permits (for 
example, year 5-permits) because recent non-point source permits and future point source permits affect the 
same constraints.  
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Even though there is a growing demand for P&NPS nutrient trading systems, dispersed and delayed impacts 
of NPS make the market design difficult and complicated. One-to-one bilateral trading is not acceptable 
because each NPS may have a unique pollution scenario over time and space which could not be offset by 
another single point or non-point source.  
Table 3. Hypothetical bids. 
Price Quantity  
 PS NPS 
$1.00 30 kg/year 6 kg/ha/year 
$0.70 15 kg/year 4 kg/ha/year 
$0.40 20 kg/year 10 kg/ha/year 
$0.20 60 kg/year 16 kg/ha/year 
$0.10 50 kg/year 12 kg/ha/year 
 
Table 4. Results of trading: prices and allocations. 
Src 
 
Bid for year-1 
permits 
Bid for year-1 to year-5 permits 
 
Buy Price Buy Price 
yr-1 yr-1 yr-1 yr-2 yr-3 yr-4 yr-5 yr-1 yr-2 yr-3 yr-4 yr-5 
 48.000 $0.02 10.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 36.000 $0.42 $0.37 $0.31 $0.25 $0.19 
2 36.000 $0.12 6.000 6.000 6.000 10.000 10.000 $0.84 $0.80 $0.72 $0.68 $0.68 
3 48.000 $0.05 10.000 10.000 10.000 10.000 20.000 $0.53 $0.48 $0.44 $0.41 $0.37 
4 48.000 $0.01 20.000 20.000 36.000 36.000 36.000 $0.25 $0.22 $0.19 $0.16 $0.12 
5 48.000 $0.07 8.412 10.000 10.000 10.000 10.000 $0.70 $0.64 $0.57 $0.52 $0.47 
6 36.000 $0.17 0.000 0.000 6.000 6.000 6.000 $1.11 $1.06 $0.98 $0.94 $0.96 
7 48.000 $0.06 10.000 10.000 10.000 20.000 20.000 $0.50 $0.49 $0.45 $0.39 $0.34 
8 20.000 $0.22 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.700 $1.37 $1.49 $1.43 $1.15 $1.00 
9 36.000 $0.18 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.000 $1.09 $1.30 $1.35 $1.04 $0.76 
10 25.396 $0.20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.000 $1.07 $1.28 $1.41 $1.17 $0.83 
11 48.000 $0.10 6.000 6.000 10.000 10.000 10.000 $0.75 $0.72 $0.66 $0.59 $0.55 
12 40.968 $0.10 10.000 6.000 10.000 10.000 10.000 $0.69 $0.71 $0.67 $0.58 $0.52 
13 48.000 $0.04 20.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 20.000 $0.37 $0.35 $0.31 $0.28 $0.26 
14 48.000 $0.03 20.000 20.000 20.000 36.000 36.000 $0.28 $0.25 $0.22 $0.20 $0.17 
15 48.000 $0.07 10.000 10.000 10.000 10.000 10.000 $0.59 $0.56 $0.51 $0.45 $0.41 
16 175.000 $0.03 175.000 175.000 175.000 125.000 125.000 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.10 $0.10 
17 175.000 $0.03 175.000 175.000 175.000 155.262 125.000 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.10 $0.10 
18 175.000 $0.03 175.000 175.000 175.000 175.000 125.000 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.10 $0.10 
19 175.000 $0.03 175.000 175.000 175.000 175.000 125.000 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.10 $0.10 
20 175.000 $0.03 175.000 175.000 175.000 175.000 151.225 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.10 $0.10 
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The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate a methodology for trading nutrient permits among PS and NPS. 
We propose a simulation-optimization approach which is similar to the simulation-optimization approaches 
used in other non-market based nutrient management programs. Simulations are used to estimate the 
spatiotemporal impacts of NPS and a linear program is used to clear the market. The linear program finds the 
optimal prices and allocations taking into account the relevant hydro-geological impacts.  
According to our results, the extent to which trade occurs among the two types of sources depends on the 
properties of NPS, mainly the time lags associated with NPS. The faster the NPS loads reach their 
destination, the greater the opportunities for trade between point and non-point sources. However, a market 
for a specific year-t0
Point and non-point source nutrient trading appears to be most suitable when nitrate transport in groundwater 
is sufficiently fast and/or point sources are willing to buy future permits.    
 permit provides fewer opportunities for trade between point and non-point sources 
because NPS permits have effects on many future years while PS have effects on a single immediate year. 
Hence, two markets are likely to exist, unless the NPS have significant impacts in the same year of the 
permit. When different permits for different future years are traded simultaneously in the same market, non-
point source bids for recent years will compete with the point source bids for future years, and the non-point 
source prices are pushed up by the distributed nature of their impacts. Therefore, the NPS have to set their 
bid prices high enough compared to PS to buy more permits.  
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